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Most of the countries worldwide have strong regulations on drug markets, in order to 
cope with the rising costs of health care. On the other hand, the regulations violate 
the incentives for investment in pharmaceutical R&D projects. Thus, in order to 
stimulate R&D activity, and at the same time to regulate pharmaceutical market, 
every government is obligated to create balanced reforms for pharmaceutical 
market. This paper presents the policies for fostering innovations and regulations in 
the pharmaceutical market in R. Bulgaria and R. Macedonia. The comparison with 
the regulations and stimulations for pharmaceutical market in USA and other EU 
countries will help in creating the most corresponding programme, both for the 
customers and pharmaceutical companies. 
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Introduction  
Innovation activity and investments in R&D (research and development) projects are 
main characteristics and drivers for sustainable development of the pharmaceutical 
industry (Civan et. al, 2009). The time in which we live in is characterized with 
increased number of chronic diseases and rapid aging population, which results with 
constant demand of new and better drugs and medical therapies. So for, success of 
one pharmaceutical company is determined by R&D activities. At the same time, in 
order to protect the customers (patients) from monopoly prices and so called “me-
too” drugs, government has responsibility to create balanced reforms for fostering 
innovation and limiting monopoly prices in the pharmaceutical market (Light et al., 
2012). 
 Most countries worldwide, especially European countries employ a huge variety 
of regulation measures at the same time both on the demand and on the supply 
side (Eger & Mahlich, 2014). As both the supply and demand side of the market is 
strongly regulated it is difficult to evaluate the effect of a specific regulatory action. 
Sood et al. (2009) showed that different regulative measures have different effects 
on pharmaceutical revenues with direct price controls having the largest negative 
impact, followed by economic evaluations and budgets.Countries with strict 
regulation such as France or Italy exhibit lower drug prices than the less regulated 
market of the United States (Danzon & Chao, 2000). Lower prices in turn make it 
more difficult for firms to redeem the rising R&D costs. All regulatory regimes that lead 
to lower drug prices can distort incentives to invest in R&D, which might incur long 











 The goal of this paper is to chart the impact of the governmental regulations on 
the pharmaceutical industry, as well as to show the need for effective and balanced 
governmental policies for the pharmaceutical market. The following four sections 
give a brief overview of the importance of well-developed regulations, showing 
positive and negative sides of the governmental policies and relationship between 
regulations and R&D investments in the pharmaceutical industry in R. Bulgaria and R. 
Macedonia. 
The Importance of Well-developed Regulations of R&D Investment 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The importance of innovative activity by firms for securing economic growth and 
welfare is generally recognized and widely documented in the scientific literature. 
Lichtenberg (2005) points out the social value of innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry. He finds out that pharmaceutical R&D and the introduction of new drugs 
have significant impact the economy through increased longevity, productivity and 
savings in other types of medical expenses.The estimations showed that for each 
extra dollar spent on prescription drugs, $4.5 is gained through productivity 
enhancement. Furthermore, each extra dollar spent on drugs reduces other health 
related expenses by almost $4. What is important is that there is a substantial rate of 
depreciation in the value of old drugs implying that future innovation is essential for 
the gains in health and wealth to be sustainable. 
 A common view is that investors view steady firm-level R&D investment as 
evidence of the firm’s commitment to R&D-based innovation.  However, recent 
research shows that R&D expenditure volatility is positively related to firm 
performance, suggesting that higher levels of R&D expenditure volatility indicate 
effective governance of the R&D function.Controlling the prices in order to restrict 
and remove formation of legal monopoly, but rewarding the companies that invest 
in R&D activities, is the key of success and achieving the benefits for the both, 
customers and pharmaceutical companies.The break in the link between the price 
of the product and the reward to the drug developer has many benefits, including 
the following: 
• Customers (patients) who need medical treatment paid by third parties, 
through insurance would no longer restrict access to medicines because of 
high prices.  Formularies for medicines should not be based upon drug prices, 
but rather the medical qualities of the medicines. 
• By restriction and removing of the legal monopolies, companies that are 
efficient and have a good reputation for quality would have an edge.  
• Incentives for marketing should be radically changed. Marketing of a product 
like vitamins, supplements, vaccines to patients who did not need that 
product, as is done by Merck, would not be profitable. Only evidence of 
benefits should generate rewards, making it less profitable to market 
medicines as if they are supplements and vaccines. 
• Inventors would effectively use patents to make claims on the prize fund, 
rather than to create monopolies for products.   
With the social significance of new drug discovery and development and the 
anticipated negative impact of pharmaceutical price controls, challenges to the 
noninterference and to produce reforms that will foster innovation and restrict the 











Government Polices with Negative Influence on Pharmaceutical 
R&D Activities 
Basic economic theory suggests that direct price controls can have disastrous 
effects on innovation by squeezing out R&D expenditures. Thus, price controls can 
lead to fewer new pharmaceutical products, products that would have improved, 
extended, or saved human lives.Giaccotto et al. (2003) provided empirical evidence 
for the contention in the context of price controls. They find that pharmaceutical 
R&D would be 30% lower if they were introduced price limits on drugs. Lowering R&D 
by 30% would result in 330 to 365 fewer new drugs within a twenty-year period. Price 
controls are widely believed to have hurt the competitiveness of pharmaceutical 
firms in Europe. 
 Table 1 summarizes the declines that would accompany various price controls, for 
example if 10 percent decline in real pharmaceutical prices in period t will cause a 
5.83 percent reduction in industry research expenditures in period t+1.The present 
value of future R&D that is “lost” because of price controls is simply the policy-
induced decline in research in period t+1 divided by r-g. 
 
Table 1 
Relationship between Decline in R&D, Life – Years Lost and Price Controls 
Decline in R&D from Price Controls Life – Years Lost from Price Controls 
Real Drug Prices R&D Investments  Real Drug Prices Life – Years Lost(Millions) 
-10% -5.8% -10% -40.1 
-20% -11.7% -20% -77.8 
-30% -17.5% -30% 113.5 
-40% - 23.3% -40% 147.1 
-50% -29.2% -50% 178.8 
Source: Vernon (2004) 
 
Price controls lower the expected returns on investments in pharmaceutical 
research, which leads firm managers to divert resources away from R&D investments 
into other investment opportunities. Also, it leads up to the point where bio-
pharmaceutical foreign direct investment is shifted into countries with less strict price 
controls (Koenig & McGarvie, 2011). Kyle’s research (2007) confirmed those findings. 
In addition, she concluded that drugs invented by firms headquartered in countries 
that use price controls reach fewer markets and with longer delays than products 
that originates in countries without price controls. 
Other contraines to R&D have also received some attention in the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Beside price control, R&D activity alsois contrained by other 
financing difficulties, showed the studies conducted in many countries about the 
effectiveness of R&D tax incentives (Mohnen, P. et al., 2008). Also, Lokshin and 
Mohnen (2009) concluded that the largest negative impact is in the first R&D period, 
after which the effect of the tax incentives declines. According to their results the 
effect of the tax incentives is the larger for smaller firms and is smaller for the larger 
firms.By loweringthe taxes of conducting R&D, the R&D incentive scheme stimulates 










Government Polices with Positive Influence on Pharmaceutical 
R&D Activities 
R&D is at the core of the pharmaceutical industry in terms of generating patents and 
exclusive rights over time. This legal rewarding system is linked to monetary rewards, 
such as retention of profits and preventing competitors from catching up or copying 
information knowledge. But, an investment in R&D activity makes economically 
sense only if it leads to more drugs and medical therapies that meet an unmet 
medical need and make a significant difference to the patient. 
 Regulation with patents means that the pharmaceutical company with brand 
new product is usually given for 10 to 20 years of exclusive rights on selling that 
product, from the day the patent is accepted by the national patent office. For 
most innovations, holding a patent is equivalent to holding a marketing authorization 
and market exclusivity for a certain period of time, until a newer, better alternative is 
introduced.Тhe role of patent or intellectual property rights (IPRs) in R&D activities,  
prove that IPR are very important in the pharmaceutical industry, much more than 
relative to other industries. Grabowsky and Vernon (2000) provided a compelling 
answer. They found out that IPRs are very significant for pharmaceutical innovation 
because of the high cost of innovation relative to thecost of imitation as generic 
products. Patent protection and data exclusivity provide innovators with a period of 
market exclusivity that allows them to recoup their large initial investments and earn 
a profit. But also, among the high selling drugs, known as blockbusters, the return to 
R&D has been substantial (five times greater than the return to all other drugs). But, 
legislative enactments that weaken IPRs and lower the price of blockbusters, without 
lowering their costs of development, could cause a cascading reduction in 
pharmaceutical innovation. On the other side, pharmaceutical and other R&D 
oriented companies are faced with lots of regulations, restrictions, very long and 
complex procedure of patent application and approval. Also, pharmaceutical R&D 
activity is primarily driven by gross profit expectations, high prevalence diseases of 
poorer countries are generally not in the focus of pharmaceutical R&D investment 
decisions (Kremer, 2002). 
 Regulations in pharmaceutical industry all over the world are often viewed as 
treat for R&D (Glans, 2014).R&D investments do not necessarily lead to drug 
innovations. So for, future research should shed more light on the quality aspects of 
the outcomes as regulation may not only decrease R&D spending but lead to a 
more efficient use. This argumentis not brand new. It has received some attention in 
the context of environmental regulation and its origin is known as the “Porter 
Hypothesis” (Porter & van der Linde,1995).A well-designed regulation can actually 
enhance competitiveness because it can trigger innovation. Applying this argument 
to the pharmaceutical industry regulation could in principle reduce the 
development of so called “me-too drugs” while maintaining or even increasing the 
number of break through innovations.Which means that the regulatory approval 
process can be reformed in a way that does not compromise public health and that 
substantially reduces the costs incurred by innovators in gaining marketing 
authorization for their innovative products. 
 This idea is supported by Love and Hubbard (2007). They believe the system for 
financing new drug development can be radically improved, spending less overall, 
aligning investment incentives more efficiently, while making drugs available to 
everyone at cheap generic prices.Reforming the way it’s paid for R&D on new 
medicines involves a simple but powerful idea. Rather than give drug developers the 










money: large monetary “prizes” tied to the actual impact of the invention on 
improvements in health care outcomes that successful products actually deliver. 
 In Aventis, a giant pharmaceutical firm, in 2002 was held a three-day scenario 
planning session. One product of that meeting involved a proposal to eliminate 
marketing monopolies for new pharmaceutical drugs, in return for a system of large 
cash prizes.  In order to ensure the entire world shared the costs of drug 
development, there would be a global treaty that set minimum levels of support for 
R&D, either through similar prizes funds, or other research projects, including open 
source research.This new system of “prizes” for newly discovered medical therapies is 
important, because creates mechanisms to stimulate R&D: 
• New drugs are needed to combat resistance to older drugs.  It is better if the 
drugs are only used when the older drugs fail, to reduce the risks of resistance 
to the new medicines. On the other hand, companies that hold the patents 
on such medicines have incentives to encourage product use, in order to 
increase their sells (Rudholm, 2002). 
• Products will be more useful if delivery systems or storage characteristics are 
improved, or medicines were used as co-formulated products or “cocktails,” 
different drugs which improve the effect with each other. Often these 
opportunities are discouraged by restrictive licensing policies set by parties 
holding patents of complementary drugs.  
• When system focuses on market exclusivity also suffers from over-investment in 
wasteful marketing activities, and often from the irrational prescribing 
practices that such marketing efforts promote.  Company designs of clinical 
trials often avoid the types of comparisons between drugs that would be most 
useful in designing rational prescribing practices. 
This system will be justified on both moral and economic grounds, because brand 
name products are on average twelve times more expensive than generics when 
purchased from manufacturers. And, price premiums for patented brand name 
products are taken in consideration for one reason only, to stimulate R&D for new 
medicines. On the other side, it is well known that most new drugs are not very 
important, because they don't offer significant improvements over existing 
medicines, but the costs of drug development for the so called “me-too” products 
are often more expensive.  The patent system is a government intervention that 
makes a compromise.  Inventors are given temporary legal monopolies. But, the 
patent system is a very expensive way to stimulate R&D, both for the companies and 
for the governments. 
Relationship between Government Polices and Pharmaceutical 
R&D Activities in R. Bulgaria and R. Macedonia 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most R&D orientedindustries in R. Bulgaria 
and R. Macedonia.Amid the continuous economic uncertainty worldwide and 
delayed growth in major economic segments,in pharmaceutical industry is 
registered impressive results. This industry constantly contributes to the production of 
products with high added value, employs highly qualified and has grown steadily in 
the years of uncertainty and deterioration in theeconomy. 
 According to IMS Health in R. Bulgaria and R. Macedonia prices of generic drugs 
are four times more affordable than the original. On the other side, self-payments 
(out of pocket cost) for drugs are 56% compared with 18% on average in other 
European countries.This is a signal for the need of improvement for better 
organization in the healthcare system, as well as fostering innovations and R&D 










governmental policy must ensure the opportunities for real competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector, which is currently impaired mainly from the requirement 
generic and biosimilar medicines have price within 80% of the original reference 
product inclusion in the positive drug list. If this requirement is not removed in a timely 
manner, in the medium and long term it will leave its deep imprint on drug 
production and pharmaceutical market. 
 An additional obstacle for encouraging R&D projects in the pharmaceutical 
industry in Bulgaria is that that the application of a generic drug for positive drug list, 
it may be included only if price is at least 20% lower than that of its referent price. This 
means that there is luck of fair competition in the pharmaceutical market, which is 
an obstacle for entry of new pharmaceutical products, whether originator or generic 
drug. In the R. Bulgaria and R. Macedonia, new innovative medical therapies are 
patent protected which means the pharmaceutical company for the brand new 
product is usually given for 10 to 20 years of exclusive rights on selling that 
product,with opportunity of 10 years extension from the day the patent is accepted 
by the national patent office. There is no other prize stimulation for R&D 
development of new medical therapies. On the other side, price regulations like 
referent prices where health insurance fund reimburse or pay only to the value of the 
referent price of the drug. Highly regulated anti monopolistic and antitrust laws, 
which is barrier for M&A contracts as one of the most effective ways of gaining 
financial support and expertise for R&D projects and highly unregulated competition 
are main obstacles for bigger number of R&D pharmaceutical projects.  
 
Methodology  
In this paper were used scientific methods applied in the social sciences. Under 
research of this topic wasused qualitative and quantitative method: deductive 
method, analysis of theoretical knowledge obtained by study of professional 
literature, method of comparison through good practices of the governmental 
policies toward pharmaceutical industry and the method of synthesis, that brings 
together the theoretical and practical knowledge ina new suggested responses. 
Data used in this research contains information of governmental policies for the most 
of EU and US countries. The observation time period(past two decades)was selected 
because of data availability and theneed of actual data for this subject. 
 
Results  
Most countries worldwide, especially European countries employ a huge variety of 
regulation measures for the pharmaceutical industry. Those regulation measures are 
crucial for the decision of starting with new R&D projects by pharmaceutical 
companies. Price controls, insufficiently regulated competition and R&D tax 
incentives aregovernmental regulations which are negatively correlated toR&D 
investment projects, while regulations with positive correlation are patent protection 
orIPRs, as well as monetary prizes for new and effective drugs and fairly regulated 
competition. R. Bulgaria as a one of the new members of EU and R. Macedonia as 
EU candidate, both have great opportunities for development of pharmaceutical 
industry, as one of most profitable and R&D oriented industry in the region. Luck of 
proper governmental regulations is a barrier for more productive and sustainable 
engagement in R&D activities for this industry.Overall, the results suggest that a 
system of rewards for brand new drugs, combined with price controls has a 












Pharmaceutical industry is one of the most profitable and R&D oriented industries, 
and also has a great social impact in a world with constantly growing older 
population and increasingly number of chronic diseases. This is why this research 
topic is of a great significance not only for the scientific forums, but also for 
governments and citizens all over the world. In order to stimulate production and 
development of new drugs, which should be completely new medical entity, not 
“me too” kind of drug, and also to protect the customers (patients) from monopoly 
prices governments are obligated to create policies which guarantee financial 
return of newly created drugs, stimulated with monetary prizes and/or patent 
protection, highly regulated competition, smaller tax incentives, shorter and easier 
R&D procedures and affordable prices for the customers.In R. Bulgaria and R. 
Macedonia, pharmaceutical market has great potential for development, based 
upon past experiences and global needsfrom this industry. Creating a good climate 
for R&D investments and better organization of the healthcare system will lead those 
countries to the leadership position in this region.   
 
Conclusion  
Creating policies which guarantee financial return of newly created drugs, 
stimulated by monetary prizes, replacing or making combination with old patent 
protection system, regulating competition, creating appropriate tax incentives, 
making shorter and easier R&D procedures, price controls satisfying both producers 
and customers, are strong reasons to gather experts from the Ministry of Healthcare, 
Ministry of Economy and pharmaceutical experts for resolving those issues. Due to 
limitation of this study and the need for improvement of global policies toward R&D 
activity in the pharmaceutical industry, this subject should be considered for further 
research. This further research should be empirically oriented and should produce 
precise measures and regulation for this issue, ready for implementation and 
adaptation in this global society. 
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